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The Nakamoto longest chain protocol is remarkably simple and has been
proven to provide security against any adversary with less than 50% of the
total hashing power. Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols are an energy efficient
alternative; however existing protocols adopting Nakamoto’s longest chain
design achieve provable security only by allowing long-term predictability,
subjecting the system to serious bribery attacks. In this thesis, we prove
that a natural longest chain PoS protocol with predictability similar to that
of Nakamoto’s PoW protocol can achieve security against any adversary with
less than 1/(1 + e) fraction of the total stake. Moreover we propose a new
family of longest chain PoS protocols that achieve security against a 50%
adversary, while only requiring short-term predictability. Our proofs present
a new approach to analyzing the formal security of blockchains, based on a
notion of Nakamoto block.
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1.1 Proof-of-work and proof-of-stake blockchains
Bitcoin is the original blockchain, invented by Nakamoto. At the core is the
permissionless consensus problem, which Nakamoto solved with a remarkably
simple but powerful scheme known as the longest chain protocol. It uses only
basic cryptographic primitives (hash functions and digital signatures). In the
seminal paper [1] that introduced the original Bitcoin protocol, Nakamoto
also showed that the protocol is secure against one specific attack, a private
double-spend attack, if the fraction of adversarial hashing power, β, is less
than half the hashing power of the network. This attack is mounted by the
adversary trying to grow a long chain over a long duration in private to
replace the public chain. Subsequently, the security of Bitcoin against all
possible attacks is proven in [2], and further extended to a more realistic
network delay model in [3].
The permissionless design (robustness to Sybil attacks) of Bitcoin is achieved
via a proof-of-work (PoW) mining process, but comes at the cost of large en-
ergy consumption. Recently proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols have emerged as
an energy-efficient alternative. When running a lottery to win the right to
propose the next valid block on the blockchain, each node wins with probabil-
ity proportional its stake in the total pool. This replaces the resource intense
mining process of PoW, while ensuring fair chances to contribute and claim
rewards.
There are broadly two families of PoS protocols: those derived from decades
of research in Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols and those inspired
by the Nakamoto longest chain protocol. Attempts at blockchain design via
the BFT approach include Algorand [4, 5] and Hotstuff [6]. The adapta-
tion of these new protocols into blockchains is an active area of research and
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engineering [5, 7], with large scale permissionless deployment as yet untested.
Motivated and inspired by the time-tested Nakamoto longest chain pro-
tocol are the PoS designs of Snow White [8] and the Ouroboros family of
protocols [9, 10, 11]. The inherent energy efficiency of the PoS setting comes
with the cost of enlarging the space of adversarial actions. In particular, the
attacker can “grind” on the various sources of the randomness, i.e., attempt
multiple samples from the sources of randomness to find a favorable one.
Since these multiple attempts are without any cost to the attacker this strat-
egy is also known as a nothing-at-stake (NaS) attack. One way to prevent
an NaS attack is to rely on a source of randomness on which a consensus
has been reached. In Snow White [8] and the Ouroboros family [9, 10, 11],
this agreed upon randomness is derived from the stabilized segment of the
blockchain from a few epochs before. Each epoch is a fixed set of consecu-
tive PoS lottery slots that use the same source of agreed upon randomness.
However, this comes at a price of allowing each individual node to simulate
and predict in advance whether it is going to win the PoS lottery at a given
slot and add a new block to the chain. Further, as the size of each epoch is
proportional to the security parameter κ (specifically, a block is confirmed if
and only if it is more than κ blocks deep in the blockchain), higher security
necessarily implies that the nodes can predict further ahead into the future.
This is a serious security concern, as predictability makes a protocol vulner-
able against other types of attacks driven by incentives, such as predictable
selfish mining or bribing attacks [12].
1.2 Nakamoto-PoS
A straightforward PoS adoption of Nakamoto protocol, which in contrast
to Ouroboros and Snow White can update randomness every block, runs as
follows; we term the protocol as Nakamoto-PoS. The protocol proceeds in
discrete time units called slots, during which each node runs the “PoS lot-
tery”, a leader election with a winning probability proportional to the stake
owned by the node – winners get to propose new blocks. Each node com-
putes hash = H(time, secret key, parentBk.hash), where the hash function
H is a verifiable random function (VRF) (formally defined in Appendix A),
which enables the nodes to run leader elections with their secret keys (the
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output hash is verified with the corresponding public key). The node n is
elected a leader if hash is smaller than a threshold ρ× staken, that is propor-
tional to its stake staken, then the node n proposes a new block consisting
of time, parentBk.hash, public key and hash, and appends it to the parent
block. A detailed algorithmic description of this protocol is in Appendix E
(with c = 1). Following Nakamoto’s protocol, each honest node runs only
one election, appending to the last block in the longest chain in its local
view. Having the hash function depend on parentBk.hash ensures that ev-
ery appended block provides a fresh source of randomness, for the following
elections. However, there is no consensus on the randomness used and the
randomness is block dependent, creating opportunities for the adversary to
mount a NaS attack by trying its luck at many different blocks.
The analysis of the security of the Nakamoto-PoS protocol is first at-
tempted in [13]. Just like Nakamoto’s original analysis, their analysis is on
the security against a specific attack: the private double-spend attack. Due
to the NaS phenomenon, they showed the adversary can grow a private chain
faster than just growing at the tip, as though its stake increases by a factor
of e. This shows that the PoS longest chain protocol is secure against the
private double-spend against if the adversarial fraction of stake β < 1/(1+e).
The question of whether the protocol is secure against all attacks, or there
are attacks more serious than the private double-spend attack, remains open.
This is not only an academic question, as well-known blockchain protocols
like GHOST [14] had been shown to be secure against the private attack,
only to be shown not secure later [15, 16].
1.3 Main contribution
Methodological Contribution. In this thesis, we show that, under a
formal security model (Chapter 3), the Nakamoto-PoS protocol is indeed
secure against all attacks, i.e., it has persistence and liveness whenever β <
1/(1 + e). One can view our result as analogous to what [2] proved for
Nakamoto’s PoW protocol. However, how we prove the result is based on an
entirely different approach. Specifically, the security proofs of [2] are based
on counting the number of blocks that can be mined by the adversary over
a long enough duration (see Fig. 1.1), and showing that the longest chain is
3
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Since there are ≥ 2 𝜆#T blocks 
and 𝜆#T are honest, at least 
𝜆#T blocks are adversarial 
=> 𝜆$ ≥ 𝜆# => β ≥ ½.
PoS Proof IdeaPoW Proof Idea
Figure 1.1: Notations: λa, λh are the rates at which the adversary and the
honest nodes can mine a block on a given block, and T is the total duration.
Left: In the PoW case, a counting argument shows that for the adversary
to create a chain to match the longest chain, β > 1/2. This proof fails to
work in the PoS case because there is no conservation of work and the total
number of adversarial blocks that can be generated over a time duration T is
exponentially larger than λaT . Right: Our proof technique. Race between
main chain and adversarial trees: an honest block is a Nakamoto block if none
of the previous NaS trees can ever catch up with the main chain downstream
of the honest block. Security is proven by showing Nakamoto blocks occur
at a non-zero frequency.
secure because the number of such adversarial blocks is less than the number
of honest blocks whenever β < 0.5. This proof approach does not give non-
trivial security results for the PoS protocol in question, because the number of
adversarial blocks is exponentially larger than the number of honest blocks,
due to the NaS phenomenon. Rather, our proof takes a dynamic view of
the evolution of the blockchain, and shows that, whenever β < 1/(1 + e),
there are infinite honest blocks, for which we use the notion of Nakamoto
blocks (first defined in [17]), each having the property that none of the past
adversary trees can ever catch up after the honest chain reaches the block
(see Fig. 1.1). These Nakamoto blocks serve to stabilize the blockchain: when
each such block enters the blocktree, complex as it may be, we are guaranteed
that the entire prefix of the longest chain up to that block remains immutable
in the future.
Although the adversary can propose an exponentially large number of
blocks, perhaps surprisingly, the protocol can still tolerate a positive fraction
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β of adversarial stake. On the other hand, the fraction that can be tolerated
( 1
1+e
) is still less than the fraction for the longest chain PoW protocol (1
2
).
In [13] and [18], modifications of the longest chain protocol (called g-greedy
and D-distance-greedy) are proposed, based on improvements to their se-
curity against the private double-spend attack. It has been shown in [19]
that, unlike the longest chain protocol, these protocols are subject to worse
public-private attacks, and they not only do not exhibit true improvements
in security than the longest chain protocol, but in many cases, they do far
worse.
New PoS Protocol Contribution. Taking a different direction, we
propose a new family of simple longest chain PoS protocols that we call c-
Nakamoto-PoS (Chapter 4); the fork choice rule remains the longest chain
but the randomness update in the blockchain is controlled by a parameter c,
the larger the value of the parameter c, the slower the randomness is updated.
The common source of randomness used to elect a leader remains the same
for c blocks starting from the genesis and is updated only when the current
block to be generated is at a depth that is a multiple of c. When updating the
randomness, the hash of that newly appended block is used as the source of
randomness. The basic PoS Nakamoto protocol corresponds to c = 1, where
the NaS attack is most effective. We can increase c to gracefully reduce the
potency of NaS attacks and increase the security threshold. To analyze the
formal security of this family of protocols, we combine our analysis for c = 1
with results from the theory of branching random walks [20]; this allows us to
characterize the largest adversarial fraction β∗c of stake that can be securely
tolerated. As c → ∞, β∗c → 1/2. We should point out that the Ouroboros
family of protocols [10, 11] achieves security also by an infrequent update
of the randomness; however, the update is much slower than what we are
considering here, at the rate of once every constant multiple of κ, the security
parameter. This is needed because the epoch must be long enough for the
blockchain in the previous epoch to stabilize in order to generate the common
randomness for the current epoch. Here, we are considering c to be a fixed
parameter independent of κ, and show that this is sufficient to thwart the NaS
attack. Technically, we show that even if c is small, there is no fundamental
barrier to achieving any desired level of security κ. Hence, achieving a high
level of security κ should not come at the cost of longer predictable window,
and in this thesis we introduce a natural adoption of Nakamoto protocol to
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Figure 1.2: The security threshold β∗c of c-Nakamoto-PoS against the predic-
tion window, equaling to c times the inter-block time, which we set to be 20s,
to match the implementation of Orouboros in Cardano. The Cardano project
currently updates the common randomness every 5 days (21600 blocks, or
10κ), while the security threshold of c-Nakamoto-PoS can approach 1/2 with
much higher randomness update frequency.
achieve this. The practical implication of this result is shown in Fig. 1.2,
where we can see that c-Nakamoto can achieve comparable security with a
much smaller prediction window than a current implementation of Orouboros
as part of the Cardano project [21].
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CHAPTER 2
PREDICTABILITY IN POS PROTOCOLS
2.1 Definition and evaluation of predictability in PoS
protocols
Table 2.1: Our results decouple the prediction window W and the security
parameter κ, achieving any combination of (W,κ). Prediction window W
for other PoS protocols are strongly coupled with the security parameter
κ = log(1/Pfailure). The maximum threshold of adversarial stake that can
be tolerated by the PoS protocols while being secure is β∗. Nakamoto-PoS
is the most basic way of extending Nakamoto protocol to the PoS setting.
This was originally introduced in [13, 18] but with an incomplete security
analysis. In Chapter 5 we show β∗c ≈ 1/2 − Θ(
√
(1/c)ln c) and numerically
tabulate β∗c (example: β
∗
c = 39% for c = 10). [9, 10, 11] are the Ouroboros
family, [8] is Snow White, [13] is g-Greedy, and [18] is D-Distance-Greedy.
Longest Chain BFT Our results
[9] [10] [11] [8] [13] [18] [4] Nakamoto-PoS c-Nakamoto-PoS








In PoW protocols such as Bitcoin, no miner knows when they will get to
propose the block until they solve the puzzle, and once they solve the puzzle,
the block is inviolable (because the puzzle solution will become invalid, oth-
erwise). This causality is reversed in proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols: a node
eligible to propose a block knows a priori of its eligibility before proposing
a block. This makes PoS protocols vulnerable to a new class of serious at-
tacks not possible in the PoW setting. We briefly discuss these attacks here,
deferring a detailed discussion to Appendix B.
Definition 1 (W -predictable). Given a PoS protocol ΠPoS, let C be a valid
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blockchain ending with block B with a time stamp t. We say a block B
enables w-length prediction, if there exists a time t1 > t and a block B1 with
a time stamp t1 such that (i) B1 can be mined by miner (using its private
state and the common public state) at time t; and (ii) B1 can be appended
to C ′ to form a valid blockchain for any valid chain C ′ that extends C by
appending w−1 valid blocks with time stamps within the interval (t, t1). By
taking the maximum over the prediction length over all blocks in ΠPoS, we
say ΠPoS is W -predictable. W is the size of the prediction window measured
in units of number of blocks.
Informally, a longest-chain PoS protocol has W length prediction window if
it is possible for a miner to know that it is allowed to propose a blockW blocks
downstream of the present blockchain. We note that our definition is similar
to the definition of W -locally predictable protocols in [12], where it has been
pointed out that PoS protocols trade off between predictability and nothing-
at-stake incentive attacks. In Table 2.1, we compare the prediction windows
of various protocols. The longest-chain family of protocols of Ouroboros
update randomness every epoch have prediction window equal to the epoch
length. Furthermore, they require the epoch length to be proportional to
the security parameter κ, since one error event is that a majority of block
producers in an epoch are not honest (and in that case, they can bias the
randomness of all future slots).
We note that in any PoS protocol with confirmation-depth κ (the number
of downstream blocks required to confirm a given block), a simple bribing
attack is possible, where a briber requests the previous block producers to
sign an alternate block for each of their previous certificates. However, such
attacks are overt and easily detectable, and can be penalized with slashing
penalties. If the prediction window W is greater than the confirmation-depth
κ, then the following covert (undetectable) attack becomes possible. An ad-
versary who wants to issue a double-spend can create a website where nodes
that have future proposer slots post their leadership certificates for a bribe.
If the adversary gets more than κ+ 1 miners to respond to this request, then
the adversary can launch the following attack: (1) collect the κ+1 leadership
certificates, (2) issue a transaction that gets included in the upcoming honest
block, (3) let the honest chain grow for κ blocks to confirm the transaction
and receive any goods in return, then (4) create a double-spend against the
8
previous transaction and (5) create a longer chain downstream of a block
including the double-spend using the κ + 1 certificates. We note that this
attack does not require participation from miners having a majority of the
stake. Far from it, it only requires κ + 1 out of the next 2κ miners each
holding a potentially infinitesimal fraction of stake. Furthermore, this attack
does not require miners to double-sign blocks, making it indistinguishable
from unexpected network latency and providing plausible deniability for the
miners who take the bribe. Thus, it is a serious covert attack on security
requiring only participants with a net infinitesimal stake to participate in it.
We note that this attack is not covered in the popular adaptive adversary
model [10, 5], since in that model, nodes are assumed not to have any agency
and remain honest till the adversary corrupts them (based only on public
state).
We note that it is not possible to mitigate the prediction issue by increasing
the confirmation depth beyond the prediction window (which is equal to the
epoch length). This is because the guarantees of existing protocols rely on
the randomness of each epoch being unbiased and this guarantee fails to hold
when a majority of nodes in an epoch are bribed through the aforementioned
mechanism in order to bias the randomness.
While our discussion so far focused on longest-chain PoS protocols, we note
that the prediction issue is even more serious in BFT based PoS protocols.
PoS-based BFT protocols that work with the same committee or same pro-
poser for many time-slots give raise to similar prediction based attacks. Even
in protocols such as Algorand [4, 5], which require a new committee for each
step of the BFT protocol, the entire set of committees for all steps of the
BFT protocol for a given block is known once the previous block is finalized.
This leads to a similar type of bribing attack where once a 2/3 majority of
a BFT-step committee coordinate through a centralized website, they can
sign a different block than the one the honest nodes agreed on. We note that
since Algorand elects a small constant size committee (proportional to κ) for
each round, a 2/3 majority of the committee can comprise a negligible total
stake. Thus, in Algorand, even though the prediction window appears negli-
gible, the confirmation delay is also small – thus leading to the same type of
attack (detailed discussion deferred to Appendix B). A formal definition of
prediction window for BFT-based PoS protocols is in Appendix B.4 where we
evaluate the prediction window W for a canonical BFT based PoS protocol:
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Algorand [4]. There is a strong coupling between the security parameter and
prediction window for Algorand, and is tabulated in Table 2.1.
2.2 Summary
We have demonstrated that both longest-chain and BFT based protocols
are highly vulnerable to prediction-based security attacks when coordinating
through an external bribing mechanism, thus compromising the persistence
and liveness of the system. These attacks are covert, i.e., the deviant behavior
is not detectable and punishable on the blockchain, and require only an
infinitesimal fraction of the stake to collude, thus significantly weakening the
security of the protocol. This motivates the study of Nakamoto-PoS (with a
very small prediction window) and the design of a new PoS protocol that has
a prediction window much shorter than the confirmation depth and can be
secure against adversaries with up to 50% of the stake. This state of affairs,





3.1 Network and adversary model
A blockchain protocol Π is directed by an environment Z(1κ), where κ is the
security parameter. This environment (i) initiates a set of participating nodes
N ; (ii) manages nodes through an adversary A which corrupts a dynamically
changing subset of nodes; (iii) manages all accesses of each node from/to the
environment including broadcasting and receiving messages of blocks and
transactions.
The protocol Π proceeds in discrete time units called slots, each consisting
of δ milliseconds (also called the slot duration), i.e. the time argument in
the input to the hash function should be in δ millisecond increments. Each
slot slr is indexed by an integer r ∈ {1, 2, · · · }. A ledger associates at most
one block to each slot among those generated (or proposed) by participating
nodes, each running a distributed protocol. Collectively, at most one block
per slot is selected to be included in the ledger according to a rule prescribed
in the protocol Π. Similar to [9], we assume that the real time window for each
slot satisfies that: (1) The time window of a slot is determined by a publicly-
known and monotonically increasing function of current time; (2) every user
has access to the current global time and any discrepancies between nodes’
local time are insignificant in comparison with the slot duration.
We follow the security model of [2, 3, 10] with an ideal functionality F .
This includes diffuse functionality and key and transaction functionality as
described below. With a protocol Π, adversary A, environment Z, and se-
curity parameter κ, we denote by VIEWn,FΠ,A,Z(κ) the view of a node n ∈ N
who has access to an ideal functionality F .
We consider a semi-synchronous network model with bounded network de-
lay similar to that of [3, 10] that accounts for adversarially controlled message
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delivery and immediate node corruption. All broadcast messages are deliv-
ered by the adversary, with a bounded network delay ∆ millisecond. Let
τ = ∆/δ be an integer. We model this bounded network delay by allowing
the adversary to selectively delay messages sent by honest nodes, with the
following restrictions: (i) the messages broadcast in slot slr must be delivered
by the beginning of slot slr+τ ; and (ii) the adversary cannot forge or alter
any message sent by an honest node. This is the so called delayed diffuse
functionality (denoted by DDiffuseτ in [10]).
The dynamically changing set of honest (or uncorrupted) nodes H ⊆ N
strictly follows the blockchain protocol Π. The key registration function-
ality (from [9]) is initialized with the nodes N and their respective stakes
(stake1, . . . , stake|N |) such that the fraction of the initial stake owned by node
n is staken/
∑
m∈N stakem. At the beginning of each round, the adversary can
dynamically corrupt or uncorrupt any node n ∈ N , with a permission from
the environment Z in the form of a message (Corrupt, n) or (Uncorrupt, n).
Even the corrupted nodes form a dynamically changing set, the total pro-
portion of the adversarial stake is upper bounded by β all the time. For
the honest nodes, the functionality can sample a new public/secret key pair
for each node and record them. For the corrupted nodes, if it is missing a
public key, the adversary can set the node’s public key, and the public keys
of corrupt nodes will be marked as such. When the adversary releases the
control of a corrupted node, the node retrieves the current view of the honest
nodes at the beginning of the following round.
Any of the following actions are allowed to take place. (i) A node can
retrieve its public/secret key pair from the functionality. (ii) A node can
retrieve the whole database of public keys from the functionality. (iii) The
environment can send a message (Create) to spawn a new node, whose lo-
cal view only contains the genesis block, and the functionality samples its
public/secret key pair. (iv) The environment can request a transaction, spec-
ifying its payer and recipient. The functionality adjusts the stakes according
to the transactions that make into the current ledger, as prescribed by the
protocol Π. The adversary has access to the state of a corrupt node n, and
will be activated in place of node n with restrictions imposed by F .
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3.2 Cryptographic primitives
Verifiable Random Function (VRF). Verifiable Random Functions (VRF),
first introduced in [22], generates a pseudorandom number with a proof of its
correctness. A node with a secret key sk can call VRFprove(·, sk) to gener-
ates a pseudorandom output Fsk(·) along with a proof πsk(·). Other nodes that
have the proof and the corresponding public key pk can check that the out-
put has been generated by VRF, by calling VRFverify(·, output, πsk(·), pk).
An efficient implementation of VRF was introduced in [23], which formally
satisfy Definition 6 in Appendix A. This ensures that the output of a VRF is
computationally indistinguishable from a random number even if the public
key pk and the function VRFprove is revealed.
Key Evolving Signature schemes (KES). We propose using forward
secure signature schemes [24] to sign the transactions to be included in a
generated block. This prevents the adversary from altering the transactions
in the blocks mined in the past. Efficient Key Evolving Signature (KES)
schemes have been proposed in [25, 10] where keys are periodically erased
and generated, while the new key is linked to the previous one. This is
assumed to be available to the nodes via the ideal functionality F . This




In this chapter, we explain our protocol following terminologies from [10]
and emphasize the differences as appropriate. The ideal functionality F
captures the resources available to the nodes in order to securely execute
the protocol. When a PoS system is launched, a collection N of nodes are
initialized. Each node n ∈ N is initialized with a coin possessing stake staken,
a verification/signing key pair (KES.vkn,KES.skn), and a public/secret key
pair (VRF.pkn,VRF.skn). The Key Evolving Signature key pair (KES) is
used to sign and verify the content of a block, while the Verifiable Random
Function key pair (VRF) is used to verify and elect leader nodes who generate
new blocks. All the nodes and the adversary know all public keys {pkn =
(KES.vkn,VRF.pkn)}n∈N . The genesis block contains all public keys and
initial stakes of all nodes, {(pkn, staken)}n∈N , and also contains a nonce in
genesis.content.RandSource. This nonce is used as a seed for the randomness.
The depth of a block in a chain is counted from the genesis (which is at
depth zero). We denote the time at the inception of the genesis block as zero
(milliseconds), such that the i-th slot starts at the time δ ·i milliseconds (since
the inception of the genesis block). Nakamoto-PoS protocol is executed by
the nodes and is assumed to run indefinitely. At each slot a node starts with
a local chain C, which it tries to append new blocks on.
4.1 Proposer selection
At each slot, a fresh subset of nodes are randomly elected to be the leaders,
who have the right to generate new blocks. To be elected one of the leaders,
each node first decides on where to append the next block, in its local view
of the blocktree. This choice of a parent block is governed by the fork choice
rule prescribed in the protocol. For example, in BitCoin, an honest node
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appends a new block to the deepest node in the local view of the blocktree.
This is known as Nakamoto protocol. We propose s-truncated longest chain
rule that includes the Nakamoto protocol as a special case, which we define
later in this chapter.
A random number of leaders are elected in a single slot, and the collective
average block generation rate is controlled by a global parameter ρ that is
adaptively set by the ideal functionality F . The individual block generation
rate is proportional to the node’s stake. The stakes are updated continuously
as the ledger is updated, but only a coin s blocks deep in the ledger can be
used in the election (the same parameter s as used in the truncated longest
chain rule), and is formally defined later in this chapter.
Concretely, at each slot, a node n ∈ N draws a number distributed uni-
formly at random in a predefined range. If this is less than the product of
its stake and a parameter ρ (Algorithm 1 line 17), the node is elected one of
the leaders of the slot and gains the right to generate a new block. Ideally,
we want to simulate such a random trial while ensuring that the outcome (i)
is verifiable by any node after the block generation; (ii) is unpredictable by
any node other than node n before the generated block has been broadcast;
and (iii) is independent of any other events. Verifiability in (i) is critical in
ensuring consistency among untrusted pool of nodes. Without unpredictabil-
ity in (ii), the adversary can easily take over the blockchain by adaptively
corrupting the future leaders. Without independence in (iii), a corrupted
node might be able to grind on the events that the simulator (and hence the
outcome of the election) depends on, until it finds one that favors its chances
of generating future blocks. Properties (ii) and (iii) are challenges unique to
PoS systems, as predicting and grinding attacks are computationally costly
in PoW systems.
To implement such a simulator in a distributed manner among mutu-
ally untrusting nodes, [5, 10] proposed using Verifiable Random Functions
(VRFs), formally defined in Appendix A. In our proposed protocol, a node
n uses its secret key VRF.sk to generate a pseudorandom hash and a proof of
correctness (Algorithm 1 line 16). If node n is elected a leader and broadcasts
a new block, other nodes can verify the correctness with the corresponding
public key VRF.pk and the proof (which is included in the block content).
This ensures unpredictability, as only node n has access to its secret key,
and verifiability, as any node can access all public keys and verify that the
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correctness of the random leader election.
The pseudorandom hash generated by VRFprove(x,VRF.sk), depends on
the external source of randomness, (x,VRF.sk), that is fed into the function.
Along with the secret key VRF.sk, which we refer to as the private source
of randomness, we prescribe constructing a header x that contains the time
(in a multiple of δ milliseconds) and a dynamically changing common source
of randomness. Including the time ensures that the hash is drawn exactly
once every slot. Including the common source of randomness ensures that
the random elections cannot be predicted in advance, even by the owner of
the secret key. Such private predictability by the owner of the secret key
leads to other security concerns that we discuss in Appendix B.
A vanilla implementation of such a protocol might (a) update stakes im-
mediately and (b) use the hash of the previous block (i.e. the parent of the
newly generated block in the main chain as defined by the fork chain rule) as
the common source of randomness. Each of these choices creates a distinct
opportunity for an adversary to grind on, that could result in serious security
breaches. We explain the potential threats in the following and propose how
to update the randomness and the stake, respectively, to prevent each of the
grinding attacks. A formal analysis of the resulting protocol is provided in
Chapter 5.
4.2 Updating the common source of randomness
One way to ensure unpredictability by even the owner of the secret key is to
draw randomness from the dynamically evolving blocktree. For example, we
could use the hash of the parent block (i.e. the block that a newly generated
block will be appended to). This hash depends only on the parent block
proposer’s secret key, the time, and the source of randomness included in the
header of the parent block. In particular, this hash does not depend on the
content of the parent block, to prevent an additional source of grinding at-
tack. However, such a frequent update of the source creates an opportunity
for the adversary to grind on. At every round, a corrupted node can run
as many leader elections as the number of blocks in the blocktree, each ap-
pending to a different block as its parent. To mitigate such grinding attacks,
we propose a new update rule for the source of randomness which we call
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c-correlation.
A parameter c ∈ Z determines how frequently we update. The common
source of randomness remains the same for c blocks, and is updated only
when the current block to be generated is at a depth that is a multiple of
c (Algorithm 1 line 19). When updating, the hash of that newly appended
block is used as the source of randomness. When c = 1, this recovers the
vanilla update rule, where a grinding attack is most effective. We can increase
c to gracefully increase the security threshold. A formal analysis is provided
in Appendix 5. When c =∞, every block uses the nonce at the genesis block
as the common source of randomness. This makes the entire future leader
elections predictable in private, by the owners of the secret keys.
4.3 Dynamic stake
The stake of a node n (or equivalently that of the coin the node possesses) is
not only changing over time as transactions are added to the blocktree, but
also over which chain we are referring to in the blocktree. Different chains
in the tree contain different sequences of transactions, leading to different
stake allocations. One needs to specify which chain we are referring to,
when we access the stake of a node. Such accesses are managed by the ideal
functionality F (Algorithm 1 line 12).
When running a random election to append a block to a parent block b at
depth `− 1 in the blocktree, a coin can be used for this election of creating
a block with depth ` if and only if the coin is in the stake at the block with
depth ` − s on the chain leading to block b. Accordingly, a node n has a
winning probability proportional to staken(b) when mining on block b, where
staken(b) denotes the stake belonging to node n as in the (s − 1)-th block
before b. Starting from an initial stake distribution staken(bgenesis), we add
to or subtract from the stake according to all transactions that (i) involve
node n (or the coin that belongs to node n); (ii) are included in the chain of
blocks from the genesis to the reference block b; and (iii) are included in the
blockchain at least s− 1 blocks before b. Here, s ∈ Z is a global parameter.
When s=1, the adversary can grind on (the secret key VRF.sk of) the
coin. For example, once a corrupted node is elected as a leader at some time
slot and proposed a new block, it can include transactions in that block to
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transfer all stake to a coin that has a higher chance of winning the election at
later time slots. To prevent such a grinding on the coin, a natural attempt is
to use the stake in the block with depth `− s when trying to create a block
at depth ` on the main chain. However, there remains a vulnerability, if we
use the Nakamoto protocol from BitCoin as the fork choice rule.
Consider a corrupted node growing its own private chain from the genesis
block (or any block in the blocktree). A private chain is a blockchain that the
corrupted node grows privately without broadcasting it to the network until
it is certain that it can take over the public blocktree. Under the Nakamoto
protocol, this happens when the private chain is longer (in the number of
blocks) than the longest chain in the public blocktree. Note that the public
blocktree grows at a rate proportional to ρ and the total stake of the nodes
that append to the public blocktree. With a grinding attack, the private
chain, which is entirely composed of the blocks generated by the corrupted
node, can eventually take over the public blocktree.
Initially, the private chain grows at a rate proportional to ρ and the stake
controlled by the corrupted node. However, after s blocks from the launch
of the private chain, the corrupted node can start grinding on the private
key of the coin; once a favorable coin is found, it can transfer the stake to
the favored coin by including transactions in the first ancestor block in the
private chain. This is possible as all blocks in the private chain belong to
the corrupted node. It can alter any content of the private chain and sign
all blocks again. With such a grinding attack (which we refer to as coin
grinding), the corrupted node can potentially be elected a leader every slot
in the private chain, eventually overtaking the public blocktree. To prevent
this private grinding attack, we propose using an s-truncation as the fork
choice rule.
4.4 Fork choice rule
An honest node follows a fork choice rule prescribed in the protocol. The
purpose is to reach a consensus on which chain of blocks to maintain, in
a distributed manner. Eventually, such chosen chain of blocks produces a
final ledger of transactions. Under the Nakamoto protocol, a node appends
the next generated block to the longest chain in its local view of the block-
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tree. Unlike PoW systems, Nakamoto protocol can lead to serious security
issues for PoS systems as discussed above. We propose using the following
s-truncated longest chain rule, introduced in [11, 13].
At any given time slot, an honest node keeps track of one main chain that
it appends its next generated block to. Upon receiving a new chain of blocks,
it needs to decide which chain to keep. Instead of comparing the length of
those two chains, as in Nakamoto protocol, we compare the creation time
of the first s blocks after the fork in truncated versions of those two chains
(Algorithm 1 line 34). Let bfork be the block where those two chains fork.
The honest node counts how long it takes in each chain to create up to s
blocks after the fork. The chain with shorter time for those s blocks is chosen,
and the next generated block will be appended to the newest block in that
selected chain. When s =∞, the stake is fixed since the genesis block, which
leads to a system that is secure but not adaptive. This is undesirable, as even
a coin with no current stake can participate in block generation. We propose
using an appropriate global choice of s < ∞, that scales linearly with the
security parameter κ. This ensures that the protocol meets the desired level
of security, while adapting to dynamic stake updates. One caveat is that we
only apply this s-truncation when comparing two chains that both have at
least s blocks after those two chains forked. If one of the chain has less than
s blocks after forking, we use the longest chain rule to determine which chain
to mine on. This is necessary in order to ensure that s-truncation is only
applied to chains with enough blocks, such that our probabilistic analysis
results hold.
4.5 Content of the block
Once a node is elected a leader, all unconfirmed transactions in its buffer are
added to the content (Algorithm 1 line 22). Along with the transactions,
the content of the block also includes the identity of the coin that won the
election, and the hash and proof from VRFprove(·). This allows other
nodes to verify the accuracy of the leader election. A common source of ran-
domness RandSource is also included, to be used in the next leader election.
The state variable in the content contains the hash of parent block, which
ensures that the content of the parent block cannot be altered. Finally, the
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header and the content is signed with the forward secure signature KES.skn.
Note that the content of the block is added after the leader election, in
order to avoid any grinding on the content. However, this allows the adver-
sary to create multiple blocks with the same header but different content. In
particular, after one leader election, the adversary can create multiple blocks
appending to different parent blocks, as long as those parent blocks share the
same common source of randomness. Such copies of a block with the same
header but different contents are known as a “forkable string” in [9] or “non-
core blocks” in [13]. We show in Chapter 5 that the Nakamoto-PoS protocol
is secure against all such variations of attacks. The protocol parameters used
in our analysis are provided in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: The parameters used in our analysis.





s parameter in the fork choice rule
φc maximum growth rate of a private tree
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CHAPTER 5
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE STATIC
STAKE PROTOCOL
In this chapter, we provide formal security analysis for the longest chain PoS
protocol. We focus on c = 1, and will discuss the general c case at the end of
this chapter and further in Appendix D. To simplify the expressions, we will
consider the regime when the time slot duration δ is very small, so that the
block generation processes can be modeled as Poisson. We will also assume
the stake distribution is static in this chapter; the case of dynamic stake is
discussed in Chapter 6.
We prove liveness and persistence of the protocol through understanding
when the longest chain converges as time passes, regardless of the adversarial
strategy. We first analyze this convergence in the setting when the network
delay ∆ = 0. This setting contains the core ideas of the proof, and allows us
to explain it with the simplest notations. Then we extend it to the case of
positive network delay. Finally, we use these results to prove high probability
guarantees on the liveness and persistence of the protocol.
5.1 Warmup: ∆ = 0
5.1.1 Random processes
In this setting, all the honest nodes have the same view of the blockchain,
which can be modeled as a random process {(T (t), C(t)) : t ≥ 0}. T (t) is a
tree and C(t) is the public longest chain at time t. The tree T (t) is interpreted
as consisting of all the blocks that are generated by both the adversary and
the honest nodes up until time t, including blocks that are kept in private
by the adversary. Note that T (t) consists of the honest blocks, mined at the
tip of the longest chain, and all the blocks that the adversary can generate,
by trying and winning the election lotteries at all possible locations of the
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blocktree. As such T (t) captures all the resources the adversary has at its
disposal to attack at time t.
The longest chain protocol in Chapter 4 results in a process described as
follows.
1. T (0) = C(0) is a single root block (the genesis block).
2. T (t) evolves as follows: there are independent Poisson processes of rate
λa at each block of T (t) (we call them the adversary processes), plus an
additional independent Poisson process of rate λh (we call it the honest
process) arriving at the last block of the chain C(t), i.e. an aggregate
Poisson process of rate λa + λh at that block (the tip of the longest
chain), and rate λa at every other block of T (t). A new block is added
to the tree at a certain block when a block is generated. An arrival
from the honest process is called an honest block. An arrival from the
adversary process is called an adversarial block.
3. The chain C(t) is updated in two possible ways : 1) an additional honest
block is added to C(t) if an arrival from the honest process occurs; 2)
an adversary can replace C(t−) by another chain C(t) from T (t) which
is equal or longer in length than C(t−).1 The adversary’s decision has
to be based on the current state of the process.
The longest chain protocol means that the honest nodes always propose
on the tip of the current public longest chain C(t) (at rate λh, proportional
to their stake). The adversary can propose on any block (at rate λa, again
proportional to its stake). The adversary can change where the honest nodes
act by broadcasting an equal or longer length chain using the blocks it has
succeeded in proposing. Since the adversary can change where the honest
nodes can propose even with an equal length new chain, that means the
adversary is given the ability to choose where the honest nodes propose when
there are more than one longest public chain.
Proving the liveness and persistence of the protocol boils down to providing
a guarantee that the chain C(t) converges as t→∞ regardless of the adver-
sary’s strategy. We will show that this happens provided that λa < λh/e,
1All jump processes are assumed to be right-continuous with left limits, so that










Our key contribution here is defining an appropriate notion of Nakamoto
Block and analyzing how frequently it occurs.
5.1.2 Nakamoto block
We first define several basic random variables and random processes which
are constituents of the processes T (·) and C(·). Then we will use them to
define the notion of Nakamoto block, and prove that indeed once it occurs,
convergence of the longest chain will occur regardless of what the adversarial
strategy is.
1. τi = generation time of the i-th honest block; τ0 = 0 is the generation
time of the genesis block, τi+1 − τi is exponentially distributed with
mean 1/λh, i.i.d. across all i’s.
2. Ah(t) = number of honest blocks generated from time 0 to t. Ah(t)
increases by 1 at each time τi. Ah(·) is a Poisson process of rate λh.
3. L(t) is the length of C(t). L(0) = 0. Note that since the chain C(t)
increments by 1 for every honest block generation, it follows that for
all i and for all t > τi,
L(t)− L(τi) ≥ Ah(t)− Ah(τi). (5.1)
4. Ti = {Ti(s) : s ≥ 0} is the random tree process generated by the
adversary starting from the i-th honest block. Ti(0) consists of the i-th
honest block and Ti(s) consists of all adversarial blocks grown on the
i-th honest block from time τi to τi + s. Note that the Ti’s are i.i.d.
copies of the pure adversarial tree T a (i.e. the tree T (t) when λh = 0).
5. Di(s) is the depth of the adversarial tree Ti(s).
Note that the overall tree T (t) is the composition of the adversarial trees
T0(t), T1(t − τ1), . . . Ti(t − τi) where the i-th honest block is the last honest
block that was generated before time t. How these trees are composed to
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form T (t) depends on the adversarial action on when to release the private
chains. We make the following important definition.
Definition 2. (Nakamoto block for ∆ = 0) Define






The j-th honest block is called a Nakamoto block if event Fj occurs.
We can interpret the definition of a Nakamoto block in terms of a fictitious
system, having the same block mining times as the actual system, where there
is a growing chain consisting of only honest blocks and the adversary trees
are racing against this honest chain. The event Eij is the event that the
adversarial tree rooted at the i-th honest block does not catch up with the
honest chain any time after the generation of the j-th honest block. Such
a tree can be interpreted as providing resource for a possible attack at the
honest chain. If Eij occurs, then there is not enough resource for the i-th
tree to attack after the j-th block. If Fj occurs, there is not enough resource
for any of the previous trees to attack the honest chain.
Even though the events are about a fictitious system with a purely honest
chain and the longest chain in the actual system may consist of a mixture
of adversarial and honest blocks, intuitively the actual chain can only grow
faster than the fictitious honest chain, and so we have the following key
lemma.
Lemma 1. If the j-th honest block is a Nakamoto block, then it will be in
the longest chain C(t) for all t > τj. Equivalently, C(τj) will be a prefix of
C(t) for all t > τj.
Proof. We will argue by contradiction. Suppose Fj occurs and let t
∗ > τj be
the smallest t such that C(τj) is not a prefix of C(t). Let bh be the last honest
block on C(t∗) (which must exist, because the genesis block is by definition
honest). If bh is generated at some time t1 > τj, then C(t−1 ) is the prefix of
C(t∗) before block bh, and does not contain C(τj) as a prefix, contradicting
the minimality of t∗. So bh must be generated before τj, and hence bh is the
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i-th honest block for some i < j. The part of C(t∗) after block bh must lie
entirely in the adversarial tree Ti(t
∗ − τi) rooted at bh. Hence,
Di(t
∗ − τi) < Ah(t∗)− Ah(τi) ≤ L(t∗)− L(τi), (5.4)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that Fj holds, and the second
inequality follows from the longest chain policy (Equation (5.1)). From this
we obtain that
L(τi) +Di(t
∗ − τi) < L(t∗), (5.5)
which is a contradiction since L(t∗) ≤ L(τi) +Di(t∗ − τi).
We will show that Nakamoto block occurs infinitely number of times if
β < 1/(1+e), and will also give an estimate on how frequently that happens.
This will imply persistence and liveness of the protocol with high probability
guarantees.
Since the occurrence of the event Fj depends on whether the adversarial
trees from the previous honest blocks can catch up with the (fictitious) honest
chain, we next turns to an analysis of the growth rate of an adversarial tree.2
5.1.3 The adversarial tree via branching random walks
The adversarial tree T a(t) is the tree T (t) when λh = 0, i.e. honest nodes
not acting. Let the depth of the tree T a(t) be denoted by D(t) and defined
as the maximum depth of its blocks. The genesis block is always at depth 0
and hence T a(0) has depth zero.
We give a description of the (dual of the) adversarial tree in terms of a
Branching Random Walk (BRW). Such a representation appears already in
[26, 27], but we use here the standard language from, e.g., [28, 20].
Consider the collection of k tuples of positive integers, Ik = {(i1, . . . , ik)},
and set I = ∪k>0Ik. We consider elements of I as labelling the vertices of a
rooted infinite tree, with Ik labelling the vertices at generation k as follows:
the vertex v = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ Ik is the ik-th child of vertex (i1, . . . , ik−1) at
level k − 1. An example of labelling is given in Fig. 5.1. For such v we also
2The mean growth rate of this tree was analyzed in [13] using difference equations.
Here, we are using the machinery of branching random walks, which not only gives us tail
probabilities but also allow the extension to the c-correlated protocol, c > 1, easily.
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let vj = (i1, . . . , ij), j = 1, . . . , k, denote the ancestor of v at level j, with
vk = v. For notation convenience, we set v0 = 0 as the root of the tree.
Figure 5.1: Labelling the vertices of a rooted infinite tree.
Next, let {Ev}v∈I be an i.i.d. family of exponential random variables of
parameter λa. For v = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ Ik, let Wv =
∑
j≤ik E(i1,...,ik−1,j) and let
Sv =
∑
j≤kWvj . This creates a labelled tree, with the following interpreta-
tion: for v = (i1, . . . , ij), the Wvj are the waiting for v
j to appear, measured
from the appearance of vj−1, and Sv is the appearance time of v. A moment’s
thought ought to convince the reader that the tree Sv is a description of the
adversarial tree, sorted by depth.
Let S∗k = minv∈Ik Sv. Note that S
∗
k is the time of appearance of a block at
level k and therefore we have
{D(t) ≤ k} = {S∗k ≥ t}. (5.6)


















Due to the exponential law of E1, E(eθE1) = λaλa−θ and therefore Λ(θ) =
log(−λa/θ).
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In fact, much more is known, see e.g. [29].
Lemma 3. There exist explicit constants c1 > c2 > 0 so that the sequence
S∗k − k/λae− c1 log k is tight, and
lim inf
k→∞
S∗k − k/λae− c2 log k =∞, a.s.
Note that Lemmas 2, 3 and (5.6) imply in particular that D(t) ≤ eλat for
all large t, a.s., and also that
if eλa > λh then D(t) > λht for all large t, a.s.. (5.7)
We will need also tail estimates for the event D(t) > eλat+ x. While such
estimates can be read from [20], we bring instead a quantitative statement
suited for our needs.
Lemma 4. For x > 0 so that eλat+ x is an integer,
P (D(t) ≥ eλat+ x) ≤ e−x. (5.8)
Proof. We use a simple upper bound. Write m = eλat + x. Note that by
(5.6),
P (D(t) ≥ m) = P (S∗m ≤ t) ≤
∑
v∈Im
P (Sv ≤ t). (5.9)
For v = (i1, . . . , ik), set |v| = i1 + · · · + ik. Then, we have that Sv has the
same law as
∑|v|
j=1 Ej. Thus, by Chebycheff’s inequality, for v ∈ Im,







































Combining (5.10), (5.11) and (5.9) yields (5.8).
5.1.4 Occurrence of Nakamoto block
If the growth rate of the adversarial tree is greater than λh, then the adversary
can always attack the honest chain by growing a side chain at a rate faster
than the honest chain’s growth rate and replace it at will. (5.7) immediately
shows that if λa > λh/e, i.e. when the adversarial fraction β > 1/(1 + e),
the growth rate of the adversarial tree is at least 1, and hence the private
attack is successful. This is what [13] showed. The question we want to
answer is what happens when β < 1/(1 + e)? Will another attack work? We
show below that in this regime, Nakamoto block has a non-zero probability
of occurrence, and this implies that no attack works.
Lemma 5. If λa < λh/e, i.e. β < 1/(1 + e), then there exists a strictly
positive constant p > 0 such that P (Fj) ≥ p for all j. Also, with probability
1, the event Fj occurs for infinitely many j’s.
The proof of this result can be found in Appendix C.1.
5.1.5 Waiting time for Nakamoto block
In the previous section, we established the fact that the event Fj has P (Fj) >
p > 0 for all j. This implies that the event Fj occurs infinitely often. But
how long do we need to wait for such an event to occur? We answer this
question in this section.
More specifically, we would like to get a bound on the probability that in
a time interval [s, s+ t], there are no Nakamoto blocks, i.e. a bound on:





Lemma 6. If λa < λh/e, i.e. β < 1/(1 + e) then there exist constants a2, A2
so that, for any s, t ≥ 0,
q[s, s+ t] ≤ A2 exp(−a2
√
t). (5.12)
The bound in (5.12) is not optimal, see Remark 1 below.
Proof. Define Rj = τj+1 − τj, and let
Bik = event that Di(
∑k−1
m=iRm) ≥ (k − i− 1). (5.13)
(Notation as in (C.3).) Note that from Lemma 4 we have



























for some positive constants A1, α1 independent of k, i. The first term in
the last inequality follows from (5.8), and the second term follows from the
fact that (λh + λae)/(2λae) > 1 and the Ri’s are i.i.d. exponential random





Divide [s, s+t] into
√
t sub-intervals of length
√
t, so that the r th sub-interval
is:





Now look at the first, fourth, seventh, etc. sub-intervals, i.e. all the
r = 1 mod 3 sub-intervals. Introduce the event that in the `-th 1 mod 3th
sub-interval, an adversarial tree that is rooted at a honest block arriving in
that sub-interval or in the previous (0 mod 3) sub-interval catches up with













Note that for distinct `, the events C`’s are independent. Also, we have
P (C`) ≤ P (no arrival in J3`+1) + 1− p < 1 (5.16)
for large enough t.











The events B and B̃ are the events that an adversarial tree catches up with
an honest block far ahead. Consider also the events




t)} > 2λht} (5.19)
D2 = {∃i, k : τi ∈ (s, s+ t), (k − i) <
√
t/2λh, τk − τi >
√
t} (5.20)
D3 = {∃i, k : τk ∈ (s, s+ t), (k − i) <
√
t/2λh, τk − τi >
√
t} (5.21)





t) while D2 and D3 are the events that there exists an interval of length√
t with at least one endpoint inside (s, s+ t) with atypically small number
of arrivals. Since the number of honest arrivals in (s, s + t) is Poisson with
parameter λht, we have from the memoryless property of the Poisson process
that P (D1) ≤ e−c0t for some constant c0 = c0(λa, λh) > 0. On the other
hand, using the memoryless property and a union bound, and decreasing
c0 if needed, we have that P (D2) ≤ e−c0
√
t. Similarly, using time reversal,
P (D3) ≤ e−c0
√
t. Therefore, again using the memoryless property of the
Poisson process,
P (B) ≤ P (D1 ∪D2 ∪D3) + P (B ∩Dc1 ∩Dc2 ∩Dc3)













where c1, c2 > 0 are constants that may depend on λa, λh and the last in-
equality is due to (5.14). We next claim that there exists a constant α > 0
so that, for all t large,
P (B̃) ≤ e−αt. (5.23)
















1/2P (τk − τi > s+ t− θ)1/2.
(5.24)
By (5.14), there exists c3 > 0 so that
P (Bi,k) ≤ e−c3(k−i−1), (5.25)
while the tails of the Poisson distribution yield the existence of constants
c, c′ > 0 so that
P (τk−τi > s+t−θ) = P (τk−i > s+t−θ) ≤
{
1, (k − i) > c(s+ t− θ)
e−c
′(s+t−θ), (k − i) ≤ c(s+ t− θ).
(5.26)




1/2P (τk − τi > s+ t− θ)1/2 ≤ e−2α(t+s−θ). (5.27)
Substituting this bound in (5.24) and using that
∑










e−2α(t+s−θ)dθ ≤ e−αt, (5.28)
for t large, proving (5.23).
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Continuing with the proof of the lemma, we have:













where the equality is due to independence, and in the last inequality we used
(5.22) and (5.23). The lemma follows from (5.16).
Remark 1. Iterating the proof above (taking longer blocks and using the
bound of Lemma 6 to improve on P (C`) in (5.16) by replacing p with the
bound from (5.12)) shows that (5.12) can be improved to the statement that
for any θ > 1 there exist constants aθ, Aθ so that, for any s, t > 0,
q[s, s+ t] ≤ Aθ exp(−aθt1/θ). (5.30)
5.2 Nonzero network delay: ∆ > 0
We will now extend the analysis in the above section to the case of non-zero
delay.
In the case of zero network delay, the power of the adversary is in the
adversarial blocks that it can generate by winning lotteries. We show that if
β < 1/(1 + e), regardless of the adversarial strategy, there will be Nakamoto
blocks occurring in the system once in a while. When the network delay is
non-zero, the adversary has the additional power to delay delivery of hon-
est blocks to create split view among the honest nodes. In the context of
the security analysis of Nakamoto’s PoW protocol, the limit of this power is
quantified by the notion of uniquely successful round in [2] in the lock-step
synchronous round-by-round model, and extended to the notion of conver-
gence opportunity in [3] in the semi-synchronous model. (This notion is
further used in [30] to provide a simpler security proof for Nakamoto’s proto-
col.) They show that during these convergence opportunities, the adversary
cannot create split view between honest nodes, because only one honest block
is generated during a sufficiently long time interval. We combine our notion
of Nakamoto block for zero delay with the notion of convergence opportunity
to define a stronger notion of Nakamoto block for the non-zero delay case.
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5.2.1 Random processes
We consider the network model in Chapter 3 with bounded communication
delay, where all broadcast blocks are delivered by the adversary with max-
imum delay ∆. With this network model, the evolution of the blockchain
can be modeled as a random process {(T (t), C(t), T (p)(t), C(p)(t) : t ≥ 0, 1 ≤
p ≤ n}, where n is the number of honest nodes, T (t) is a tree, T (p)(t) is an
induced sub-tree of T (t) in the view of the p-th honest node at time t, and
C(p)(t) is the longest chain in the p-th tree. Then let C(t) be the common
prefix of all the local honest chains C(p)(t) for 1 ≤ p ≤ n. The tree T (t) is
interpreted as consisting of all the blocks that are generated by both the ad-
versary and the honest nodes up until time t, including blocks that are kept
in private by the adversary. The chain C(p)(t) is interpreted as the longest
chain in the local view of the p-th honest node at time t. The process is
described as follows.
1. T (0) = T (p)(0) = C(0) = C(p)(0), 1 ≤ p ≤ n is a single root block (the
genesis block).
2. T (t) evolves as follows: there are independent Poisson processes of rate
λa at each block of T (t) (we call them the adversary processes), plus
an additional independent Poisson process of rate λ
(p)
h (we call it the
honest process) arriving at the last block of the chain C(p)(t) (the tip





A new block is added to the tree at a certain block when an arrival
event occurs at that node. An arrival from the honest process is called
an honest block. An arrival from the adversary process is called an
adversarial block.
3. The sub-tree T (p)(t) for each 1 ≤ p ≤ n is updated in three possible
ways : 1) an additional honest block can be added to T (p)(t) by the
adversary if an arrival event of the honest process with the p-th honest
node occurs; 2) a block (whether is honest or adversarial) must be
added to C(p)(t) if it appears in T (q) for some q 6= p at time t − ∆;
3) the adversary can replace T (p)(t−) by another sub-tree T (p)(t) from
T (t) as long as T (p)(t−) is an induced subgraph of the new tree T (p)(t).
The adversary’s decision has to be based on the current state of the
process.
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4. C(p)(t) is updated as follows for each 1 ≤ p ≤ n: C(p)(t) is the longest
chain in the tree T (p)(t) starting from the root block at time t. If
there are more than one longest chain, tie breaking is in favor of the
adversary.
5. C(t) is updated as follows: C(t) is the common prefix of all the local
honest chains C(p)(t) for 1 ≤ p ≤ n at time t.
The adversary can change where the honest nodes act by broadcasting an
equal or longer length chain using the blocks it has succeeded in proposing.
Since the adversary can change where the honest nodes can propose even with
an equal length new chain, that means the adversary is given the ability to
choose where the honest nodes propose when there are more than one longest
public chain. Also the adversary has the ability to have one message delivered
to honest nodes at different time (but all within ∆ time).
5.2.2 Nakamoto block
We first define several basic random variables and random processes which are
constituents of the processes T (·) and C(·). We make use of the terminology
in [30].
1. τi = generation time of the i-th honest block; τ0 = 0 is the mining time
of the genesis block, τi+1 − τi is exponentially distributed with mean
1/λh, i.i.d. across all i’s. Suppose an honest block B is generated at
time τj. If τj − τj−1 > ∆, then we call B is a non-tailgater (otherwise,
B is a tailgater). If τj − τj−1 > ∆ and τj+1 − τj > ∆, then we call B is
a loner. Note that non-tailgaters have different depths and a loner is
the only honest block at its depth.
2. Hh(t) = number of non-tailgaters generated from time 0 to t.
3. L(p)(t) is the length of C(p)(t) for each 1 ≤ p ≤ n. L(p)(0) = 0. Note
that since every non-tailgater appears at different depth in the block
tree, it follows that for all t > s+ ∆,
L(p)(t)− L(p)(s) ≥ Hh(t−∆)−Hh(s). (5.31)
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4. Ti = {Ti(s) : s ≥ 0} is the random tree process generated by the
adversary starting from the i-th honest block. Ti(0) consists of the i-th
honest block and Ti(s) consists of all adversarial blocks grown on the
i-th honest block from time τi to τi + s. Note that the Ti’s are i.i.d.
copies of the adversarial tree T a.
5. Di(s) is the depth of the adversarial tree Ti(s).
We are now ready to put everything together to define Nakamoto blocks
in general.
Definition 3. (Nakamoto block for general ∆) Define






Uj = event that j-th honest block is a loner = {τj−τj−1 > ∆, τj+1−τj > ∆},
(5.34)
and
Ûj = F̂j ∩ Uj. (5.35)
The j-th honest block is called a Nakamoto block if it is a loner and event Ûj
occurs.
And we have the following lemma, which justifies that Nakamoto blocks
stabilize the blockchain for the non-zero delay case.
Lemma 7. If the j-th honest block is a Nakamoto block, then it will be in
the chain C(t) (i.e. in all local chains C(p)(t), 1 ≤ p ≤ n) for all t > τj + ∆.
This implies that the longest chain until the j-th honest block has stabilized.
Proof. We will argue by contradiction. Suppose Ûj occurs and let t
∗ > τj+∆
be the smallest t such that the j-th honest block is not contained in C(t). Let
bh be the last honest block on C(p)(t∗) (which must exist, because the genesis
block is by definition honest). If bh is mined at some time t1 > τj + ∆, then
C(p)(t−1 ) is the prefix of C(p)(t∗) before block bh, and does not contain the j-th
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honest block, contradicting the minimality of t∗. So bh must be mined before
time τj +∆. And since the j-th honest block is a loner, we further know that
bh must be mined before time τj, hence bh is the i-th honest block for some
i < j. The part of C(p)(t∗) after block bh must lie entirely in the adversarial
tree Ti(t∗ − τi) rooted at bh. Hence, we have
Di(t
∗ − τi) < Hh(t∗ −∆)−Hh(τi) ≤ L(p)(t∗)− L(p)(τi), (5.36)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that F̂j holds, and the second
inequality follows from the longest chain policy (Equation (5.31)). From this
we obtain that
L(p)(τi) +Di(t
∗ − τi) < L(p)(t∗) (5.37)
which is a contradiction since L(p)(t∗) ≤ L(p)(τi) +Di(t∗ − τi).
Note that, Lemma 7 implies that if Ûj occurs, then the entire chain leading
to the j-th honest block from the genesis is stabilized after the j-th honest
block is seen by all the honest nodes.
5.2.3 Occurrence of Nakamoto block
Lemma 8. If λa < g/e · λh, i.e. β < g/(g + e) with g = e−λh∆, then there is
a p > 0 such that P (Ûj) ≥ p for all j. Also, with probability 1, the event Ûj
occurs for infinitely many j’s.
The proof of this result can be found in Appendix C.2.
5.2.4 Waiting time for Nakamoto block
We have established the fact that the event Ûj has P (Ûj) > p > 0 for all
j. In analogy to the zero-delay case, we would like to get a bound on the
probability that in a time interval [s, s + t], there are no Nakamoto blocks,
i.e. a bound on:




The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 6 in the zero-delay case. Its
proof is almost verbatim identical, and will not be repeated here.
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Lemma 9. If λa < g/e · λh, i.e. β < g/(g + e), then there exist constants
ā2, Ā2 so that for all s, t ≥ 0,
q̃[s, s+ t] ≤ Ā2 exp(−ā2
√
t). (5.38)
The improvement mentioned in Remark 1 applies here as well.
5.3 Persistence and liveness
We will now use Lemma 9 to establish the persistence and liveness of the
basic longest chain PoS protocol.
In the absence of any adversary, each node will contribute to the final
ledger as many blocks as their proportion of the stake. In the presence of
an adversary, the chain quality property ensures that the contribution of the
adversary is bounded. When β < g/(g + e), we show that these properties
hold with high probability, as stated in the following theorem.
Our goal is to generate a transaction ledger that satisfies persistence and
liveness as defined in [2]. Together, persistence and liveness guarantees robust
transaction ledger; honest transactions will be adopted to the ledger and be
immutable.
Definition 4 (from [2]). A protocol Π maintains a robust public transaction
ledger if it organizes the ledger as a blockchain of transactions and it satisfies
the following two properties:
• (Persistence) Parameterized by τ ∈ R, if at a certain time a transaction
tx appears in a block which is mined more than τ time away from
the mining time of the tip of the main chain of an honest node (such
transaction will be called confirmed), then tx will be confirmed by all
honest nodes in the same position in the ledger.
• (Liveness) Parameterized by u ∈ R, if a transaction tx is received by all
honest nodes for more than time u, then all honest nodes will contain
tx in the same place in the ledger forever.
The main result is that common prefix, chain quality, and chain growth
imply that the transaction ledger satisfies persistence and liveness.
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Theorem 1. Distributed nodes running Nakamoto-PoS protocol generates
a transaction ledger satisfying persistence (parameterized by τ = σ) and




Proof. We first prove persistence and then liveness.
Lemma 10 (Persistence). The public transaction ledger maintained by Nakamoto-




Proof. For a chain Ct with the last block generated at time t, let Cdσt be the
chain resulting from pruning a chain Ct up to σ, by removing the last blocks
at the end of the chain that were generated after time t− σ. Note that Cdσ
is a prefix of C, which we denote by Cdσ  C.
Let C1 be the main chain of an honest node P1 at time t1. Suppose a
transaction tx is contained in Cdσ1 at round t1, i.e., it is confirmed by P1.
Consider a main chain C2 of an honest node P2 at some time t2 ≥ t1. The
σ-common prefix property ensures that after pruning a longest chain, it is
a prefix of all future longest chains in the local view of any honest node.
Formally, it follows that Cdσ1  C2, which completes the proof.
We are left to show that the σ-common prefix defined below holds with
a probability at least 1 − e−Ω(
√
σ). This is a variation of a similar property
first introduced in [2] for PoW systems. Ours is closer to a local definition
of k-common prefix introduced in [31], which works for a system running for
an unbounded time.
Definition 5 (σ-common prefix). We say a protocol and a corresponding
confirmation rule have a σ-common prefix property at time t, if in the view
VIEWn,FΠ,A,Z(κ) of a honest node n at time t, n adopts a longest chain C, then
any longest chain C ′ adopted by some honest node n′ at time t′ > t satisfies
Cdσ  C ′.
Let Ct denote the longest chain adopted by an honest node with the last
node generated at time t. There are a number of honest nodes generated
in the interval [t − σ, t], each of which can be in Ct, Ct′ , or neither. We
partition the set of honest blocks generated in that interval with three sets:
Ht , {Hj ∈ Ct : τj ∈ [t − σ, t]},Ht′ , {Hj ∈ Ct′ : τj ∈ [t − σ, t]}, and
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Hrest , {Hj /∈ Ct∪Ct′ : τj ∈ [t−σ, t]}, depending on which chain they belong
to.
Suppose Cdσt 6 Ct′ , and we will show that this event is unlikely. Under
this assumption, we claim that none of the honest blocks generated in the
interval [t − σ, t] are stable, i.e. for each honest block, there exists a time in
the future (since the generation of that block) in which the block does not
belong to the longest chain.
Precisely, we claim that Cdσt 6 Ct′ implies that F cj holds for all j such that
τj ∈ [t− σ, t]. This in turn implies that P (Cdσt 6 Ct′) ≤ P (∩j:τj∈[t−σ,t]F cj ). By
Lemma 9, we know that the probability of this happening is low: e−Ω(
√
σ).
This follows from the following facts. (i) The honest blocks in Ct does not
make it to the longest chain at time t′: Hj /∈ Ct′ for all Hj ∈ Ht. This follows
from Cdσt 6 Ct′ . (ii) The honest blocks in Ct′ does not make it to the longest
chain Ct at time t: Hj /∈ Ct for all Hj ∈ Ht′ . This also follows from Cdσt 6 Ct′ .
(iii) The rest of the honest blocks did not make it to either of the above:
Hj /∈ Ct ∪ Ct′ for all Hj ∈ Hrest.
We next prove liveness.
Lemma 11 (Liveness). The public transaction ledger maintained by Nakamoto-




Proof. Assume a transaction tx is received by all honest nodes at time t,
then by Lemma 9, we know that with probability at least 1− e−Ω(
√
σ), there
exists one honest block Bj mined at time τj with τj ∈ [t, t + u] and event
Fj occurs, i.e., the block Bj and its ancestor blocks will be contained in any
future longest chain. Therefore, tx must be contained in block Bj or one
ancestor block of Bj since tx is seen by all honest nodes at time t < τj. In
either way, tx is stabilized forever. Thus, the lemma follows.
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5.4 Extending the analysis to general c
We can repeat the analysis in the previous sections for the c-Nakamoto-PoS
for c > 1. Like for c = 1, the analysis basically boils down to the problem
of analyzing the race between the adversarial tree and the fictitious purely
honest chain. In Appendix D, we confine our analysis to a study of that
race. It turns out that under c-correlation randomness, the adversarial tree is
developed by another branching random walking process, but with a slowing





and it goes from
e−λh∆
e−λh∆ + e
for c = 1 to
e−λh∆
e−λh∆ + 1
for c =∞. Under the c-correlation protocol, we have
φc = −
cθ∗c
log(−θ∗c ) + (c− 1) log(1− θ∗c )
,
where θ∗c is the unique negative solution of Equation (5.39)




We numerically compute the value of φc and β
∗
c with ∆ = 0 in Table 5.1.




c 1 2 3 4 5




0.31003 0.33219 0.34691 0.35772
c 6 7 8 9 10
φc 1.73110 1.68103 1.64060 1.60705 1.57860
β∗c 0.36615 0.37299 0.37870 0.38358 0.38780
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In the deployment of the Ouroboros protocol in the Cardano project,3 each
slot takes 20 seconds and each epoch is chosen to be 5 days [21], that is a
common randomness will be shared by 21600 blocks. In Fig. 1.2, we plot the
security threshold β∗c against c up to c = 21600 for our c-Nakamoto-PoS. It
turns out the security threshold of c-Nakamoto-PoS can approach 1/2 very
closely even when c is much less than 21600, which is the current randomness




SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMIC
STAKE PROTOCOL
6.1 Permissionless PoS
One major advantage of the Nakamoto protocol in the proof of work setting
is its permissionless setting: anyone can join (leave) the system by simply
contributing (extricating) computing power for the mining process. Under
the PoS setting the stakes are used in lieu of the computing power. To
support a protocol that is close to a permissionless system, we need to handle
the case when the stake is dynamically varying. Unlike the case of compute
power, the entry/removal of stake has to be more carefully orchestrated: if a
change in the stake takes effect immediately after the transaction has been
included in the blockchain, then this gives an opportunity for the adversary
to grind on the secret key of the header (time, secret key, common source of
randomness). Concretely, once an adversary has generated a block, it can
add a transaction that moves all its stake to a new coin with a new pair
of public and secret keys. The adversary can keep drawing a new coin and
simulating the next leader election, until it finds one that wins. This is a
serious concern as the adversary can potentially win all elections.
To prevent such a grinding on the coin, we use s-truncation introduced in
[11, 13]. s-truncation has two components: using stakes from ancestor blocks
and a fork choice rule. The winning probability of a leader election uses the
stake computed at an ancestor block which is s blocks above the parent block
that is currently being mined on. However, this allows an adversary to launch
a long range attack, for any value of s <∞. To launch a long range attack,
an adversary grows a private block tree. Once it has grown for longer than s
blocks, then it can grind on the coin to win the election for the next block,
and add the favorable transaction to the first ancestor block. As all blocks
in this private tree are adversarial, the consistency of the transactions can be
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maintained by re-signing all intermediate blocks. This allows the adversary
to win all elections after s private blocks, and eventually take over the honest
block chain.
The s-truncation longest chain rule works as follows. When presented with
a chain that forks from current longest chain, a node compares the two chains
according to the following rule. Both chains are truncated up to s blocks after
the forking. Whichever truncated chain was created in a shorter time (and
hence denser) is chosen to be mined on. This ensures that honest block
chains will be chosen over privately grown adversarial chains with long range
attacks. A detailed description of the c-correlation, s-truncation, Nakamoto-
PoS protocol is in Chapter 4.
6.2 Security of s-truncation scheme
We extend Theorem 1 to show that the above s-truncation scheme is secure.
Theorem 2. Under the dynamic stake setting, distributed nodes running
Nakamoto-PoS protocol with a choice of s = Θ(σ) generates a transaction




Proof sketch. We prove it in three steps. First, we show that with static
stake setting, common prefix, chain growth, and chain quality properties still
hold for s-truncation protocol with s = Θ(σ). Second, we show that with
dynamic stake setting and s stake update rule, the adversary can mine a
private chain with consecutive s blocks that is denser than the public main
chain only with a negligible probability.
We show in Chapter 5 that the choice of c only determines how many
fraction of adversary the system can tolerate and not the security parameter
κ. On the other hand, the choice of s is critically related to the target
security parameter κ. By decoupling these two parameters c and s in the
protocol, we can achieve any level of predictability (with an appropriate
choice of c), while managing to satisfy any target security parameter κ (with




We proposed a new family of PoS protocols and proved that our proposed
PoS protocols have low predictability while guaranteeing security against ad-
versarial nothing-at-stake attacks. We did not discuss the design of incentive
systems that encourage users to follow the honest protocol. We point out
that there are existing ideas that could be naturally adapted for our problem.
For example, one way to minimize NaS attacks is to require users to deposit
stake that can be slashed if the node has a provable deviation (for example,
double-signing blocks) [8, 32]. Another important idea is that fruitchain-type
incentive mechanisms [33] which protect against selfish mining in PoW can
be ported to PoS protocols [9]. However, as pointed out in [12], the full
problem of designing PoS protocols that strongly (instead of weakly) disin-
centivize NaS and selfish-mining attacks remains an important direction of
future research. Finally, a detailed mathematical modeling of bribing attacks
that consider interaction between the blockchain and external coordination




Definition 6 (from [23]). A function family F(·)(·) : {0, 1}a(κ) → {0, 1}b(κ)
is a family of VRFs is there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm Gen and deterministic algorithms VRFprove and VRFverify such
that Gen(1κ) outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk); VRFprove(x, sk) computes
(Fsk(x), πsk(x)), where πsk(x) is the proof of correctness; and the algorithm
VRFverify(x, y, π, pk) verifies that y = Fsk(x) using the proof π. Formally,
we require
1. Uniqueness: no values (pk, x, y1, y2, π1, π2) can satisfy the equation
VRFverify(x, y1, π1, pk) = VRFverify(x, y2, π2, pk) when y1 6= y2.
2. Provability: if (y, π) =VRFprove(x, sk), then VRFverify(x, y, π, pk) =
1.
3. Pseudorandomness: for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm






(x, st)← AVRFprove(·)1 (pk);
y0 = Fsk(x);
y1 ← {0, 1}b(k);
z ← {0, 1};





This ensures that the output of a VRF is computationally indistinguishable






Proof-of-work (PoW) protocols such as Nakamoto’s protocol for Bitcoin achieve
high security while maintaining a high unpredictability as to which miners
can propose future blocks. A very attractive feature of this PoW protocol
is that nodes that mine a valid block have no further ability to update the
block after they have solved the mining puzzle, since the nonce seals the
block making it tamper-proof. Thus no node knows whether they have the
power to propose the block till they solve the puzzle, and once they solve the
puzzle, they have no future rights to alter the content.
This causality is reversed in proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols: usually, the
node that is eligible to propose a block knows a priori of its eligibility before
proposing a block. This makes PoS protocols vulnerable to a new class
of serious attacks not found in the PoW setting. We will show that a set
of miners controlling an infinitesimal fraction of the stake can potentially
completely undermine the security of the protocol. We demonstrate that the
longer the prediction window, the more serious the attack space is. This
raises an important questions as to whether it is possible to design a secure
proof-of-stake protocol which has minimal prediction window.
We point out that an existing work [12] has already raised this issue that
PoS protocols are forced make a tradeoff between predictability and NaS
attacks. While that work mainly concerned itself with incentive attacks, our
concern here is adversarial attacks that compromise consensus. We point out
that even in the adversarial setting, all provably secure PoS protocols have
a long prediction window; the main contribution of this thesis is to design
such a protocol and show its security up to 50% of adversarial stake.
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Figure B.1: Structure of bribing attack.
B.1 Adaptive adversaries and the VRF attack
A popular model that has been proposed to capture the effect of future
prediction in the PoS setting is the so-called adaptive adversary model [10, 5].
In the adaptive adversary model, a node remains honest unless corrupted by
an adversary (who can change who they are corrupting based on the public
state). The adversary has a bound on how many nodes it can corrupt at any
given time. To defend against an adaptive adversary model, many protocols
have moved from global predictability of future block proposers (i.e., everyone
knows who the future block leaders are) [9] to local predictability (i.e., each
miner knows when in the future they will propose a block) [10, 5]. The local
predictability is achieved using a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) [34]
based leader-election.
However, the adaptive adversary model assumes that miners do not have
any independent agency but rather only get corrupted based on an adver-
sary’s instructions. An adversary can easily circumvent this assumption by
establishing a website where it can offer a bribe to anyone who posts their
credentials for proposing blocks in an upcoming epoch of time. Thus even
when the node’s future proposer status is not public knowledge, this brib-
ing website can solicit such information and help launch serious attacks (see
Fig. B.1).
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B.2 Longest chain protocols
We first consider longest-chain PoS protocols, in order to demonstrate our
prediction attacks. We begin with a definition of prediction window of a
protocol.
Definition 7 (W -predictable). Given a PoS protocol ΠPoS, let C be a valid
blockchain ending with block B with a time stamp t. We say a block B is
w(B)-predictable, if there exists a time t1 > t and a block B1 with a time
stamp t1 such that (i) B1 can be mined by miner (using its private state and
the common public state) at time t; and (ii) B1 can be appended to C ′ to
form a valid blockchain for any valid chain C ′ that extends C by appending
w − 1 valid blocks with time stamps within the interval (t, t1). By taking
the maximum over the prediction parameter over all blocks in ΠPoS, i.e.,
let W = maxB w(B), we say ΠPoS is W -predictable. W is the size of the
prediction window measured in units of number of blocks.
We note that our definition is similar to the definition of W -locally pre-
dictable protocols in [12]. We note furthermore that longest chain protocols
also have a κ-deep confirmation policy, where a block embedded deep enough
is deemed to be confirmed.
B.3 Prediction attack on W -predictable protocols
Let us consider a W -predictable protocol, where the prediction window W is
longer than the confirmation window κ. We note that the prediction window
of many existing protocols are quite large, as demonstrated in Table 2.1 and
therefore this is a reasonable assumption. We will consider the alternative
case (W << κ in the upcoming section).
Consider block B that has been mined at time t (assume that B is W -
predictable, since such a block exists by definition). The adversary launches
a prediction attack by launching a website where it announces a reward
for miners which possess a future block proposal slot. Some of the leaders
respond to this call (these are shown with a red outer circle in Fig. B.2). We
note that while the adversary requires κ + 1 leaders out of 2κ + 1 slots to
respond to the bribe, the total stake represented by these bribed leaders can
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Figure B.2: Prediction attack on Ouroboros Praos.
be a very tiny fraction of the total stake. The adversary bribes these leaders
to sign a forked version of the blockchain that it hoards till the block s is
confirmed by a κ-deep honest chain. After that point, the adversary releases
the hoarded blockchain to all the users thus switching the longest chain and
confirming a block s′ (which contains a double-spend) instead of s. We note
that this attack is indistinguishable from network delay since none of the
bribed leaders sign multiple blocks with a single leadership certificate - thus
nodes that participate in the bribing attack have plausible deniability.
We note that the previous attack can be launched whenever the prediction
window W is larger than the confirmation depth κ. However, here we will
briefly note that even when W is smaller than κ, the protocols still have a
prediction problem. This is because in longest-chain PoS protocols such as
Ouroboros, Praos, Snow White, the randomness is updated every epoch and
a key assumption for the updated randomness to be unbiased is that a ma-
jority of the previous leaders were honest. However, by bribing the previous
leaders, the adversary can bias the randomness (for example, by choosing
a subset of proposers), thus leading itself to more favorable leadership slots
in the upcoming epoch (and effectively enlarging the prediction window), as
shown in Fig. B.3. These protocols offer no protection against these bribed
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Figure B.3: Randomness grinding enlarges prediction ability.
randomness grinding attacks and hence their security parameter is limited
to be of the same order as the epoch size. We note that while our proposed
protocol has a structure similar to that of Ouroboros, our analysis proves
security against adversarial randomness grinding (the so-called NaS attack).
B.4 Prediction attack on BFT-based PoS protocols
While we have focused on longest chain PoS protocols in the previous section,
here we consider the other large family of PoS protocols that are based on
Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus (BFT). Some PoS-based BFT protocols
work with the same committee for many time-slots thus giving raise to pre-
diction based attacks. Furthermore, in many BFT protocols, a single leader
proposes blocks till evicted for wrong-doing [6], thus making the prediction
problem worse. Among BFT-based PoS protocols, the one with the least
prediction window is Algorand [4, 5]. We will demonstrate a fatal prediction
attack on Algorand (other BFT protocols which are even more predictable
are naturally attacked as well).
In Algorand, at each round, a set of leaders and many sets of committees
are elected using VRF from the previous finalized block. The leaders and
committee members can construct their membership certificates from the
previous finalized block’s randomness, and others do not know their identities
till they reveal themselves. The BFT consensus process proceeds in steps and
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Figure B.4: Algorand bribing attack.
each step is run by a different committee - a block is considered finalized if
it is voted on by a 2/3-majority of committee members at any step.
This feature is used to prove that Algorand is secure against adaptive
adversaries. However, we show that Algorand is not immune to the bribing-
based prediction attack (similar to the one for longest-chain protocols). Since
the protocol does not use a sequence of blocks for confirmation, the prediction
window defined for longest-chain protocols is not the appropriate measure for
prediction-attacks in this protocol. Rather, the appropriate measure is what
fraction of the committee participants are locally known when a block is
proposed. For Algorand, all of the committee participants are known to
themselves.
Suppose in a given round, there are two leaders blocks B and B′ (the latter
block may contain a double-spend relative to B). The adversary solicits using
a website the committee members to post their certificates. If the adversary
is able to obtain a 2/3-quorum in any step, then the adversary can use that
quorum to sign a different certificate than the one the honest nodes signed.
In particular, the adversary waits for a honest quorum to sign a certificate
for B in order to confirm the transaction and then signs a bribed quorum
from a different step to certify B′. This enables the adversary to reverse a
confirmation. We note that none of the bribed miners have to double-sign a
block since they would not have been elected in other steps of the quorum.
We illustrate this bribing attack on Algorand in Fig. B.4.
We note that establishing a stalling-attack is even easier in this model
- the adversary needs a 1/3-fraction of committee members in a step to
remain silent in order to stall the progress of Algorand. Given that miners
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are randomly sampled, this quorum may hold a very small fraction of stake
(which the adversary may compensate for using its bribe). This stalling
attack can be used to launch extortion attacks demanding a large amount of
money to un-stall the network.
B.5 Summary of prediction attacks
We have demonstrated that both longest-chain and BFT based protocols
are highly vulnerable to prediction-based security attacks (compromising the
safety and liveness of the system). This motivates the design of a new PoS
protocol that can only be predicted with a look ahead window, much shorter
than the confirmation window.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 5
C.1 Proof of Lemma 5
In this proof, we renormalize time such that λh = 1, and we set λa = λ to
simplify notations.
The random processes of interest start from time 0. To look at the system
in stationarity, let us extend them to −∞ < t <∞. More specifically, define
τ−1, τ−2, . . . such that together with τ0, τ1, . . . we have a double-sided infinite
Poisson process of rate 1. Also, for each i < 0, we define an independent
copy of a random adversarial tree Ti with the same distribution as T0.
These extensions allow us to extend the definition of Eij to all i, j, −∞ <





Note that Ej ⊂ Fj, so to prove that Fj occurs for infinite many j’s with
probability 1, it suffices to prove that Ej occurs for infinite many j’s with
probability 1. This is proved in the following.
Define Rj = τj+1 − τj and
Zj = (Rj, Tj). (C.1)
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Consider the i.i.d. process {Zj}−∞<j<∞. Now,
Eij = event that Di(t− τi) < Ah(t)− Ah(τi) for all t > τj
= event that Di(τk − τi) < Ah(τk−)− Ah(τi) for all k > j
= event that Di(τk − τi) < Ah(τk)− Ah(τi)− 1 for all k > j
= event that Di(τk − τi) < k − i− 1 for all k > j
= event that Di(
∑k−1
m=iRm) < k − i− 1 for all k > j.
Hence Ej = ∩i<jEij has a time-invariant dependence on {Zi}. This means
that p = P (Ej) does not depend on j. Since {Zj} is i.i.d. and in particularly
ergodic, with probability 1, the long term fraction of j’s for which Ej occurs
is p, which is nonzero if p 6= 0. This is the last step to prove.
Let
E0 = event that Di(
∑k−1
m=iRm) < k − i− 1 for all k > 0 and i < 0 (C.2)
and
Bik = event that Di(
∑k−1






Let us fix a particular n > 0, and define:
Gn = event that Rm <
1
n
for m = −n,−n+ 1, . . . ,−1, 0,+1, . . . , n− 1.
(C.5)
Then
P (E0) ≥ P (E0|Gn)P (Gn) (C.6)
























The last inequality (C.9) comes from the fact P (Bik|Gn) = P (B−k,−i|Gn).
Using (5.8), we can bound P (Bik|Gn). Consider three cases:
Case 1: −n ≤ i < 0 < k ≤ n:
For k − i < 4
√
n, we have that
P (Bik|Gn) = P (Di(
k−1∑
m=i



















where Γλ ∼ Exp(λ).
For k − i ≥ 4
√
n, we have that
P (Bik|Gn) = P (Di(
k−1∑
m=i







≤ P (Di(2) ≥ 4
√
n− 1) ≤ e− 4
√
n+1+2eλ, (C.14)

































which is bounded and moreover ān → 0 as n→∞.

























for some positive constants A1, α independent of n, k, i. The first term in the
last inequality follows from (5.8), and the second term follows from the fact

















which is bounded and moreover b̄n → 0 as n→∞.































for some positive constants A2, α independent of n, k, i. The first term in the
last inequality follows from (5.8), and the second term follows from the fact
that (1 + λe)/(2λe) > 1 and the Ri’s have mean 1.
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which is bounded and moreover c̄n → 0 as n→∞.
Substituting these bounds in (C.9) we finally get:
P (E0) > [1− (ān + 2b̄n + c̄n)]P (Gn). (C.15)
By setting n sufficiently large such that ān, b̄n and c̄n are sufficiently small,
we conclude that P (E0) > 0.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 8
In this proof, we fix g = e−λh∆ and renormalize time such that λh = 1, and
we set λa = λ to simplify notations.
The random processes of interest start from time 0. To look at the system
in stationarity, let us extend them to −∞ < t <∞. More specifically, define
τ−1, τ−2, . . . such that together with τ0, τ1, . . . we have a double-sided infinite
Poisson process of rate 1. Also, for each i < 0, we define an independent
copy of a random adversarial tree Ti with the same distribution as T0.
These extensions allow us to extend the definition of Êij to all i, j, −∞ <






V̂j = Êj ∩ Uj.
Note that V̂j ⊂ Ûj, so to prove that Ûj occurs for infinite many j’s with
probability 1, it suffices to prove that V̂j occurs for infinite many j’s with
probability 1. This is proved in the following.
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Define Rj = τj+1 − τj and
Zj = (Rj, Tj).
Consider the i.i.d. process {Zj}−∞<j<∞. Now,
Uj ∩ Êij = Uj ∩ event that Di(t− τi) < Hh(t−∆)−Hh(τi) for all t > τj + ∆
= Uj ∩ event that Di(t+ ∆− τi) < Hh(t)−Hh(τi) for all t > τj
= Uj ∩ event that Di(τk− + ∆− τi) < Hh(τk−)−Hh(τi) for all k > j
= Uj ∩ event that Di(
∑k−1
m=iRm + ∆) < Hh(τk−1)−Hh(τi) for all k > j.
Hence Êj ∩ Uj =
⋂
i<j Êij ∩ Uj has a time-invariant dependence on {Zi},
which means that p = P (V̂j) does not depend on j. Since {Zj} is i.i.d. and
in particularly ergodic, with probability 1, the long term fraction of j’s for
which V̂j occurs is p, which is nonzero if p 6= 0. This is the last step to prove.
P (V̂0) = P (Ê0|U0)P (U0) = P (Ê0|U0)P (R0 > ∆)P (R−1 > ∆) = g2P (Ê0|U0).
It remains to show that P (Ê0|U0) > 0.
Ê0 = event that Di(
∑k−1
m=iRm + ∆) < Hh(τk−1)−Hh(τi) for all k > 0 and i < 0.
(C.16)
Let
B̂ik = event that Di(
∑k−1






Let us fix a particular n > 2∆ > 0, and define:




P (Ê0|U0) ≥ P (Ê0|U0, Gn)P (Gn|U0) (C.20)
=
(




















P (B̂ik|U0, Gn). (C.25)
Using (5.8), we can bound P (B̂ik|U0, Gn). Consider two cases:
Case 1: −n ≤ i < 0 < k ≤ n:
P (B̂ik|U0, Gn) = P (B̂ik|U0, Gn,
k−1∑
m=i
Rm + ∆ ≤ 3n) + P (
k−1∑
m=i












Rm > 5n/2)/P (U0)
≤ A1e−α1n
for some positive constants A1, α1 independent of n, k, i. The last inequality
follows from the fact that Ri’s are i.i.d. exponential random variables of










which is bounded and moreover ān → 0 as n→∞.
Case 2: k > n or i < −n:
For 0 < ε < 1, let us define event W εik to be:
W εik = event that Hh(τk−1)−Hh(τi) ≥ (1− ε)g(k − i− 1).
Then we have
P (B̂ik|U0, Gn) ≤ P (B̂ik|U0, Gn,W εik) + P (W εik
c|U0, Gn).
Let Xj be a Bernoulli random variable such that Xj = 1 if and only if
Rj−1 > ∆, i.e., the j-th honest block is a non-tailgater. Since Rj’s are i.i.d.
exponential random variables with mean 1, we have that Xj’s are also i.i.d.
and P (Xj = 1) = g. By the definition of Hh(·), we have Hh(τk−1)−Hh(τi) =∑k−1
j=i+1Xj, then
P (W εik
c|U0, Gn) = P (
k−1∑
j=i+1














Xj < (1− ε)g(k − i− 3))
≤ A2e−α2(k−i−3) (C.26)
for some positive constants A2, α2 independent of n, k, i. The last inequality
follows from the Chernoff bound.
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Meanwhile, we have








Rm + ∆) ≥ (1− ε)g(k − i− 1))
| U0, Gn,W εik,
k−1∑
m=i














(k−i−1) + P (
k−1∑
m=i




where the first term in the last inequality follows from (5.8), and the second

























for some positive constants A3, α3 independent of n, k, i. The last inequality
follows from the fact that (g+λe)/(2λe) > 1 and the Ri’s have mean 1, while
P (U0,W
ε
ik) is a event with high probability as we showed in Equation (C.26).
Then we have























which is bounded and moreover b̄n → 0 as n→∞ when we set ε to be small
enough such that (1− 2ε)g − λe > 0.
Substituting these bounds in Equation (C.23) we finally get:
P (Ê0|U0) > [1− (ān + b̄n)]P (Gn|U0). (C.27)
By setting n sufficiently large such that ān and b̄n are sufficiently small, we
conclude that P (V̂0) > 0.
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APPENDIX D
GROWTH RATE OF C-CORRELATED
ADVERSARY TREE
We set λa = λ in this section to simplify notations.
The adversary is growing a private chain over the genesis block, under the
c-correlation. As illustrated in Fig. D.1, the common source of randomness
at a block is only updated when the depth is a multiple of c (Algorithm 1











The randomness of a block changes only at godfather-blocks. In other words,
for n ∈ Z, blocks along a chain at depths
{
nc, nc+ 1, nc+ 2, · · · , nc+ c− 1
}
share a common random number. Two blocks are called siblings-blocks if they
have the same parent block. Given this shared randomness, the adversary
now has a freedom to choose where to place the newly generated blocks. The
next theorem provides a dominant strategy, that creates the fastest growing
private tree.
Lemma 12. Under c-correlation, the optimal adversarial strategy to grow
the tree fast is to only fork at the parents of godfather-blocks.
Proof. Note that under the security model, several types of grinding attacks
are plausible. First, at depth multiple of c, the adversary can grind on the
header of the parent of the godfather block, and run an independent election
in every round. Secondly, for blocks sharing the same source of random-
ness, once an adversary is elected a leader, it can generate multiple blocks of
the same header but appending on different blocks. However, adding multi-












Figure D.1: An example of T (a)(t) with c = 5 under the optimal strategy
to grow the private NaS tree. Blocks forking from the same godfather-block
share the same common source of randomness, as shown by the colors. To
grow the tree fast, it is optimal to grow a single chain until the next godfather
block. Circles with black outlines indicate blocks that are currently mined
on.
Sibling non-godfather blocks share a common source of randomness and
thus “mining events” on these blocks are completely dependent. Specifically,
for sibling non-godfather blocks, there is only one leader election in each
round. As a result, for a particular non-godfather block b, the child-block
of b’s any younger sibling (a sibling block mined after block b) should share
the same header and identical source of randomness with one of b’s child-
block. Thus it is not necessary for a non-godfather block to have sibling
blocks, that is, mining a sibling to a non-godfather block does not increase
the growth rate of the longest chain in the adversarial block tree. However,
sibling god-father blocks have independent sources of randomness and thus
mining multiple such block increase the growth rate of the longest chain.
Here we use the representation in Fig. D.1, whose growth rate is the same
as the full NaS adversarial tree as shown in Lemma 12. We can transform the
tree T (a)(t) in Fig. D.1 into a new random tree T 0(t). Every c generations
in T (a)(t) we can view as a single generation in T 0(t); in the example of
Fig. D.1, we have depth 0, 5, 10 etc. (i.e., all the godfather depths) as the
generations in T 0(t). T 0(t) corresponds to a branching random walk. For
example, the genesis block B0 is the root of T
0(t) at depth 0 with arrival time
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0. The children blocks of B0 in T
0(t) are the descendant blocks at depth 5 in
T (a)(t). We can order these children blocks in their arrival times. Consider
block B1 to be the first such block, then the arrival time of block B1 is
S1 = X1 +X2 + . . .+Xc,
where Xi is the inter-arrival time between block at depth i− 1 and block at
depth i in T (a)(t). Note that all the Xi’s are exponential with parameter λ,
and they are all independent. Similarly, the arrival time Si of the i-th child
of root in T 0(t) is a sum of i+ c− 1 i.i.d. exponential random variables with
parameter λ.
Let the depth of the tree T a(t) and T 0(t) be denoted by Da(t) and D(t)
respectively defined as the maximum depth of the blocks in the tree.
Similar to Chapter 5, each vertices at generation k can be labelled as a k
tuple of positive integers (i1, . . . , ik) with ij ≥ c for 1 ≤ j ≤ k: the vertex
v = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ Ik is the (ik− c+ 1)-th child of vertex (i1, . . . , ik−1) at level
k− 1. Let Ik = {(i1, . . . , ik) : ij ≥ c for 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, and set I = ∪k>0Ik. For
such v we also let vj = (i1, . . . , ij), j = 1, . . . , k, denote the ancestor of v at
level j, with vk = v. For notation convenience, we set v0 = 0 as the root of
the tree.
Next, let {Ev}v∈I be an i.i.d. family of exponential random variables of
parameter λ. For v = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ Ik, let Wv =
∑
j≤ik E(i1,...,ik−1,j) and let
Sv =
∑
j≤kWvj . This creates a labelled tree, with the following interpreta-
tion: for v = (i1, . . . , ij), the Wvj are the waiting for v
j to appear, measured
from the appearance of vj−1, and Sv is the appearance time of v.
Let S∗k = minv∈Ik Sv. Note that S
∗
k is the time of appearance of a block at
level k and therefore we have
{Da(t) ≥ ck} = {D(t) ≥ k} = {S∗k ≤ t}. (D.1)



















Due to the exponential law of E1, E(eθcE1) = λλ−θc and therefore Λc(θc) =
log(−λc/θc(λ− θc)c−1).
An important role is played by θ∗c , which is the negative solution to the
































In fact, much more is known, see e.g. [29].
Proposition 2. There exist explicit constants c1 > c2 > 0 so that the
sequence S∗k − k/ληc − c1 log k is tight, and
lim inf
k→∞
S∗k − k/ληc − c2 log k =∞, a.s.
Note that Propositions 1,2 and (D.1) imply in particular that Da(t) ≤
cηcλt for all large t, a.s., and also that
if cηcλ > 1 then D
a(t) > t for all large t, a.s. (D.2)
Let us define φc := cηc, then φcλ is the growth rate of private c-correlated
NaS tree. One can check that φc is the solution to the same equation as in
[35], where the same problem is solved with a differential equation approach.
[35] also proves the uniqueness of φc and provides an approximation for large











We will need also tail estimates for the event D(t) > ηcλt+ x. While such
estimates can be read from [20], we bring instead a quantitative statement
suited for our needs.
Theorem 3. For x > 0 so that ηcλt+ x is an integer,
P (Da(t) ≥ φcλt+ cx) = P (D(t) ≥ ηcλt+ x) ≤ eΛc(θ
∗
c )x. (D.3)
Proof. We use a simple upper bound. Write m = ηcλt + x. Note that by
(D.1),
P (D(t) ≥ m) = P (S∗m ≤ t) ≤
∑
v∈Im
P (Sv ≤ t). (D.4)
For v = (i1, . . . , ik), set |v| = i1 + · · · + ik. Then, we have that Sv has the
same law as
∑|v|
j=1 Ej. Thus, by Chebycheff’s inequality, for v ∈ Im,










































Algorithm 1 on page 69 provides the pseudocode for our proposed Nakamoto-
PoS Protocol.
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Algorithm 1 Nakamoto-PoS (c, s, δ)
1: procedure Initialize( )
2: BlkTree← genesis . Blocktree
3: parentBk ← genesis . Block to mine on
4: unCnfTx ← φ . Blk content: Pool of unconfirmed txs
5: procedure PosMining(coin)
6: while True do
7: SleepUntil(SystemTime % δ == 0) . System time is miner’s machine time
8: time ← SystemTime
9: (KES.vk,KES.sk),(VRF.pk,VRF.sk) ← coin.Keys()
10: // Update the stake according to the stake distribution in the s-th last block
in the main chain.
11: stakeBk ← SearchChainUp(parentBk, s)
12: stake← coin.Stake(stakeBk)
13: ρ←UpdateGrowthRate(parentBk)
14: // Three sources of randomness: a common source (par-
entBk.content.RandSource), a private source (coinSecretKey), and time.
15: header← 〈parentBk.content.RandSource , time〉
16: 〈hash,proof〉 ← VRFprove(header,VRF.sk) . Verifiable Random Function
17: if hash < ρ× stake then . Block generated
18: // Update common source of randomness every c-th block in a chain as per
c-correlation scheme
19: if parentBk.Height() % c == c− 1 then RandSource ← hash
20: else RandSource ← parentBk.content.RandSource
21: state ← Hash(parentBk)
22: content ← 〈 unCnfTx, coin, RandSource, hash, proof, state 〉 and break
// Return header along with signature on content
23: return 〈header, content,Sign(content,KES.sk)〉
24: // Function to listen messages and update the blocktree
25: procedure ReceiveMessage(X) . Receives messages from network
26: if X is a valid tx then
27: undfTx ← unCnfTx ∪ {X}
28: else if IsValidBlock(X) then
29: Xfork ← the highest block shared by the main chain and the chain leading to X
30: Lfork ← min(parentBk.Height(), X.Height()) - Xfork.Height()
31: if Lfork < s then . If the fork is less than s blocks
32: if parentBk.Height() < X.Height() then
33: ChangeMainChain(X) . If the new chain is longer
34: else . check s-truncated longest chain rule
35: MainChainBk ← SearchChainDown(parentBk, Xfork, s) . find the s-th
block down the main chain from fork
36: NewChainBk ← SearchChainDown(X, Xfork, s) . find the s-th block
down the new chain from fork
37: if NewChainBk.header.time < MainChainBk.header.time then
38: ChangeMainChain(X) . If the new chain is denser
39: procedure IsValidBlock(X) . returns true if a block is valid
40: if not IsUnspent(X.content.coin) then return False
41: if X.header.time > SystemTime then return False





46: procedure Main( )
47: Initialize()
48: StartThread(ReceiveMessage)
49: while True do
50: block = PosMining(coin)
51: SendMessage(block) . Broadcast to the whole network
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